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On Right-Wing Movements, Spheres, and Resonances:  
Interview with Ben Anderson and Rainer Mühlhoff  
 
This interview began in Berlin and continued virtually, as an active email exchange, between 
November 2017 and April 2018. The conversation was sparked by the recent and ongoing turn to 
the right in global politics. It departs from exploring ‘affective modes of inquiry’, which our 
interview partners have applied in their articles ‘The Affective Styles of Donald Trump’ 
(Anderson 2017) and ‘Fatal Identification’ (Mühlhoff 2017a). We then move on to discuss the 
events of Brexit in the UK and the return of the far right to German Parliament in 2017, as much 
as recent terms such as ‘techlash’ or ‘fake news’. Against this background, we tackle the core 
concern of this special issue by asking for the locations of affect in the concepts of ‘affective 
resonance’ (Mühlhoff 2015, 2019b) and ‘(atmo)spheres’ (Anderson 2009). Finally, we ponder 
the potential of ‘affective counterpolitics’ and the challenges this brings for an academic 
engagement with realpolitik. 
KEYWORDS: Right-Wing Populism; Spheres; Resonances; Locating Affect; Trump; 
Counterpolitics 
 
VW: If we look at analyses of the rise of right-wing populism in Europe and the USA, there 
seems to be a tendency to explain these developments by referring to notions of ‘affect’. Do you 
think affect has, historically speaking, reached a new quality?  
 
BA: I start from a slightly different place. The emergence of right-wing populisms has been 
accompanied by a proliferation of attempts to diagnose the public moods that supposedly 
characterize the contemporary condition. Typically, this involves identifying named moods that 
supposedly unite a group or groups (anger, resentment, a feeling of being left behind, and so on) 
and are expressed in the events that are then taken to compose the phenomena of right-wing 
populism. It’s a way of telling a compelling story about the contemporary condition. I’m 
skeptical of it, partly because any explanatory mode of inquiry risks not staying with the event; it 
risks reinscribing lines between cause and effect (with the affective or emotive no longer being 
that which should be explained, but now standing as that which does the explaining). And it risks 
creating a frame that reduces the event—and the potentialities and possibilities that not only 
accompany events but are what an event is—to the already named and known. It enables a 
consoling story that teaches us that we already always know what is happening.  
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I’m reading Age of Anger: A History of the Present by Pankaj Mishra (2017) at the moment, and 
the book is symptomatic of this kind of approach and its problems. As with other examples of 
this genre of explanation, ‘anger’ as the named mood does a lot of work; it unites disparate 
groups at the level of a feeling that motivates, it mediates between the group and the political 
event or act that is the expression of the mood, and it becomes the source of critique. Now this 
approach does generate insights about the force of collective affects and, implicitly, the strange 
forms they take, but it is also part of a desire for explanation, to make sense of a moment felt as 
turbulent. So, to return to your question, I don’t think we should grant emotion or affect 
explanatory power, or, rather, there are modes of inquiry in addition to the explanatory for 
relating to and encountering how affective life happens. My starting point is to experiment with 
descriptive and speculative modes of inquiry that discern the geo-historically specific 
apparatuses, encounters, and conditions through which affective life becomes organized. This 
doesn’t involve a claim about the special status of affect or emotion today.  
 
RM: I think that ‘affect’ is an important concept to understand current forms of political 
mobilization and shifts in political subjectivity. I agree with Ben that such an explanation must 
not be reductive; and I see it precisely as the pursuit of current affect theories to articulate 
nonreductive explanations of the role of affectivity in social and political processes.  
To stay on the level of phenomena for one second—the current rise of right-wing populism, or 
political ‘mobilization’ in general—it is clear to me that such a thing as affect has always been 
involved in social and political processes. The general relevance of affect per se is not something 
new. Yet what does change in the course of history is the modes of affectivity, that is, the 
concrete interactive forms, mediated spaces, temporal patterns of affective dynamics, as well as 
the way affectivity is intertwined with discourse, with power structures and with hierarchies. 
Important questions, to me, are: In what specific way are events of political mobilization, 
outburst, or articulation carried by an interplay of ‘affective dispositions’ (Mühlhoff 2019a) in 
people with societal distributions of wealth, power, and discourses? What are the microsocial 
underpinnings of these dynamics in the realm of something that may be called ‘affective 
subjectivation’? That is to say, where does the capacity to affect and be affected, for instance by 
populist political speech or by a neo-authoritarian tone, come from?  
Answering these questions in a mode of critical inquiry leads to affectivity not as a phenomenal 
but as a theoretical category—and here there might indeed be something new brought by the 
‘affective turn’ (Clough 2007; Gregg and Seigworth 2010). In social theory and philosophy, 
affect has not always been central, or to be more precise, there is a history of dichotomous and 
pejorative understandings of affectivity as that which undermines rationality, reason, maturity, 
enlightenment, etc. The role of affect in politics is then connected to regression to an uncivilized, 
animal, barbaric state of society. Now, the difficulty is: Although right-wing populism is 
barbaric, it is important to point out that this is not because it is driven by affects. Every political 
movement and every critical project is driven by affects, so the point is not whether or not affect 
is relevant, but how it is involved. Contemporary affect studies are seeking for a nondichotomous 
understanding of affect that opens up to an understanding of the complex interplay of modes of 
affecting and being affected with discourses and power structures. An affect-theoretical analysis 
of right-wing populism could then ask for the forms of affecting and being affected (and their 
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microsocial presuppositions) that are typical for subjectivities that engage in this movement.  
 
LK: Speaking of affective ‘modes of inquiry’, to borrow from Ben, both of you have written on 
Donald Trump and affect. Which were your intentions, if not ‘explaining’ populism with affect? 
 
BA: When I wrote ‘The Affective Styles of Donald Trump’ I was interested in how his tone of 
anger coexisted with others in ways that suggest there is much more going on in the 
contemporary conjuncture than a resurgence of racialized resentment, as important and 
absolutely critical that is to understanding the present. What does it tell us about the present that 
Trump appeared to be giving people permission to once again enjoy their resentments? Or that 
he was offering the promise of dignity and recognition, albeit only ever for some racialized 
groups? And that he was enacted as a figure of action without constraint, for example in relation 
to the fantasy of a wall? So my attempt to understand Trump’s different affective styles was 
really an attempt to interrupt any analysis of contemporary populism that reduces it to, or 
identifies it with, a single, dominant mood.  
 
RM: I agree on opposing accounts that reduce populism to a single dominant mood, and I find 
Ben’s analysis of the ‘affective styles’ of Trump very helpful. To stress this again, one can use 
affect as an explanatory category (and I see Ben doing this as well), but when I say ‘affect’ I 
mean affectivity, and that should be distinguished from affects (in the countable plural). By 
affectivity I mean, following Spinoza and Deleuze, a fundamental register of being that manifest 
itself in interpersonal dynamics of affecting and being affected, and that relies on certain 
capacities of each individual to affect and be affected by others. For instance, a psychology of 
ressentiments is a certain disposition of such affective capacities. This disposition can be 
triggered in a specific way by a hybrid mix of discursive and affective stimuli. In my article on 
Trump and his sexism [part II of ‘fatal identifications’ 2017a] I pointed out how the public 
denunciations of Trump’s sexism and of his political incompetency might actually have helped 
his campaign because it resonated with the affective dispositions of some voters. What made him 
‘attractive’ is not his concrete positions in political questions but rather his attitude towards the 
machine of professional politics, media, and ‘elites’. The way he was denounced as stupid and 
chauvinistic, and constructed as ‘not to be taken seriously when it comes to matter-of-fact 
political debates,’ could easily be framed as a form of humiliation by ‘elitist’ media and 
politicians, and this humiliation could resonate affectively with the real humiliation many people 
who are left behind (economically and socially) might feel.  I argued that by a mechanism of 
‘fatal identification’ with Trump, accusations of sexism, stupidity, insufficient language level, 
etc., did not actually hit Trump but affected those of his followers who have heard such 
accusations against themselves before. Trump, in turn, could use this ‘fatal identification’ of his 
followers to appear even ‘stronger’ by way of refusing to even try to play on the same level of 
political and media debate as his critics and competitors (of both parties). 
BA: One of the puzzles in the background to piece was to try and understand why critiques of 
Trump from the left—of his sexism, of his xenophobia, of his racism—were absolutely 
necessary, but at the same time insufficient. They missed something about Trump’s performance, 
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something about his mediatized enactment as a particular kind of figure, and something of 
people’s attachments and investments in him. If Trump is symptomatic of a certain type of 
populism, then, ultimately, they miss how contemporary populisms resonate with some people’s 
affective lives. With a few exceptions, there’s still a residual tendency in critical work to 
presume that power works through the manipulation or modulation of fear, anxiety, and other so-
called ‘negative’ emotions.  
The implications of the folding of oppositional energies into the constitution of the event of 
Trump means that his authority and legitimacy was from the beginning, and will remain, 
fragile—the circulation of outrage and anger against him were part of the conditions of formation 
for Trump as political event. And we have seen that playing out since his inauguration, in the 
unprecedented scenes of protest that, uniquely for an American president, suspended many of the 
conventions around the suspension of critique of a new president. This means that it’s not only 
possible but a responsibility to tell different stories about what the contemporary is that 
emphasizes those other tendencies that can’t be reduced to the story that we now live in a 
populist moment. The problem in equating the event of Trump’s emergence with a ‘populist 
moment’ is that the event was constituted, in part, through the circulation of outrage in relation to 
and response to Trump, as well as a set of closely related affective relations of bemused or 
indignant fascination. So the event of Trump is constituted, in part, by the circulations of 
repulsion and anger at revelations of his sexual harassment. They were absolutely necessary, but 
they also generated interest and attention in Trump; the constant proliferation of minor events 
associated with him, their piling up as they came and went, meant that he was constantly part of 
the landscapes of events. 
 
CHP: Would you go about your investigations differently nowadays, for example in light of the 
events of Brexit in the UK and the return of the far right to the German Parliament? 
 
RM: I would (and am starting to) investigate the whole development from a slightly broader 
perspective of emerging new forms of authoritarianism. What kind of modalities does an 
authoritarian psychology (or affectivity, or subjectivity) take in our times? Populism, seen 
through this lens, is but one modality. It would be a mistake to limit the debate of the shifts in  
contemporary politics to the underdogs in the Rust Belt, the ‘undereducated’, ‘working-class’, 
‘resigned white men’ projecting their frustrations on immigrants. All this is true and these 
resentments are a problem. But an important part of the big picture is also that there is, in my 
observation, a new style of authoritarian psychology in milieus which are anything but 
undereducated or socioeconomically sidelined. I have, for instance, been writing about a type of 
neo-authoritarianism in Silicon Valley companies that is circling around the ideal of ‘emergent 
leadership’ and affectively stylized work environments (Mühlhoff 2018).  
A slightly different but related form of this is evident in the diverse spheres of the alt-right 
movement. One of their strategies is to oppose the achievements of cultural critique by openly 
misogynist, xenophobic, and racist media interventions such as trolling, fake news, and 
providing spaces for extremist online subcultures (Nagle 2017). Others start from the insights of 
cultural critique to justify processes of reckless social selection facilitated by a transhumanist 
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vision of a ‘singularity’. In the wake of a new age of artificial intelligence technologies based on 
big data, there is a growing acceptance of the idea that discrimination of social groups is not an 
evil but a necessary side effect of an ongoing ‘fundamental revolution of mankind as a whole’. 
This attitude is very authoritarian but hard to break down to superficial affective dynamics of 
resentment. So the kind of research I would do today is a more broadly based investigation into 
new modes of racist, classicist, misogynist, and otherwise violent political movements also in 
privileged milieus beyond the ‘popular classes’.  
 
BA: There is a difficult question here about which tendencies and trajectories we pay attention to 
as we tell stories about what the present is and what might become. I’m less convinced than 
Rainer about the import of that transhumanist vision of a ‘singularity’ to the alt-right, or, rather, 
I’m as interested in how critical attention to what is still a marginal idea is, in part, symptomatic 
of the emergence of what some call a ‘techlash’—anxiety about the threat of ‘big tech’.  
To return back to the discussion about modes of inquiry, I’m interested in practicing a type of 
hopeful criticism that attempts to stay with the multiplicity of tendencies that compose a 
conjuncture. Thinking about the situation today, I’d start—or am starting in current work—by 
understanding what I do think Trump and Brexit have in common: a palpable feeling of an 
absence of control, or what Lauren Berlant (2011) has rightly, I think, described as a crisis of 
practical sovereignty. I was struck that one of the commonalities across the Trump and Brexit 
campaigns was the critique of bureaucracy or, rather, how a critique of bureaucracies stood in for 
palpable feelings of thwartedness and stuckness. Now, that sense is folded into the intensification 
of forms of white resentment that we see today. It is absolutely a matter of new types of racism. 
It is also a sense that is being responded to by left and progressive organizations. For example, 
Labour’s general election campaign under the leadership of Jeremy Corbyn in the UK offered 
participation in the democratic process as a different kind of solution to that palpable sense of an 
absence of control.  
My sense is that contemporary politics will turn on different responses to what I think has 
crossed a threshold to become a widespread structure of feeling. Entwined with that, I would also 
try and understand the political life of disappointed hopes or failed promises, and the emerging 
force of blame and attachment of responsibility for nonrealization. And how blame coexists with 
intensified hostility to groups or individuals felt to be interrupting or halting some kind of 
promised change. In Britain, a whole series of figures have emerged around which anger has 
gathered and become attached as a way of making sense of the nonrealization of the promises of 
Exit; ‘remoaners’, the EU, judges, metropolitan elites, and so on.  
Consider, for example, how in the UK the figure of the ‘remoaner’ functions as a way of 
attaching blame and delegitimizing dissent or disagreement. And it is done in strikingly affective 
terms—remoaners have the wrong tone and the wrong relation to futurity. If responses to a 
feeling of the absence of control and the political lives of disappointed hopes as well as how 
hopes are maintained are necessary to understanding the present situation, it’s also important to 
understand how that which is supposedly in crisis transforms and continues in the midst of the 
unsettling that is a crisis. I’d like, for example, to think about the reemergence of a form of 
anxious liberalism—whereby the critique of liberal institutions and forms and figures is met by 
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anxiety about their dissolution and an increased bellicose support for liberalism felt in an 
intensified mockery of nonliberal figures. What’s striking about the figures of populism in the 
US and UK—Trump and Nigel Farage—is that they are figures of mockery, disdain, and 
derision.  
 
CHP: Rainer, do you agree with Ben’s approach to ‘hopeful criticism’?  
RM: In theory I like the idea of a ‘hopeful criticism’, but practically, I’m afraid I don’t share its 
optimism. At least not while the constellation at hand is still so little understood, in particular on 
its (infra)structural and its social-psychological levels. In order to expand on a previous point, I 
think one cannot overemphasize the import of the role of media and media technologies in all 
these phenomena that were mentioned—and there is even a lot of conceptual work to be done in 
order to reach an informed critique. The circulation of affects and information, the formation of 
political movements and countermovements are all inherently mediatized. Last year, 
broadcasting media and social media were about equal in market shares of news consumption, 
but the impact of the latter on society is still largely unknown. Here it is important that media are 
not only amplifiers or ‘transmitters’ of discourses and affects, they are not only increasing the 
range of interpersonal processes that would otherwise be more local. We need a much better 
understanding of how media is constitutive and generative of modes of affectivity and political 
speech, of subjectivity and intersubjectivity.  
An investigation into this also implies a critique (in the sense of ‘deep understanding’) of the 
economic and ideological structures that are behind the rise of new media technologies. The 
diagnosis of a new ‘anxiety of ‘big tech’ too easily distracts from a detailed analysis of how new 
media technology interferes with social and societal distributions of wealth, capital, and power. 
Examples such as the discussion of targeted advertising in political campaigns, recently 
exemplified by the case of ‘Cambridge Analytica’ and its potential involvement in Trump’s 
election campaign, show the direct connection between the practical relevance of new media 
technologies for everybody and the (perhaps still uncovered or marginal) ideological structures 
of those running these services. After all, the New Economy has brought about a new class of 
capital owners and economic authorities (tech entrepreneurs typically aged twenty-five to thirty-
five) that are now, in times of an incipient alt-right movement, increasingly mingling with the 
old (postaristocratic) class of capital owners.  
As an addition, the criticism of bureaucracy, alongside that of representative democracy as an 
‘outdated technology’, is shared by tech-optimistic but neoconservative ideologies. Direct 
democracy today is in most cases accompanied by the vision of technologically enabled 
structures of political participation, while it is less acknowledged that these structures will 
always be interwoven with (if not explicitly owned by) economic actors. Instead of a dispute 
over anxiety vs. antianxiety of technological advances I would therefore say that we need new 
approaches and new concepts in critical social theory that shed more light on the details of the 
triangle of politics, media, and affectivity.  
 
VW: Discussions about populism are often combined with the diagnosis of a post-truth era and 
the power of ‘fake news’. Where does this leave affect? 
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BA: What strikes me about the contemporary is an intensified desire for truth, which of course 
may be symptomatic of the set of changes that are gathered within the diagnosis of the ‘post-
truth’, understood as a partly nostalgic longing for some kind of disinterested account of how the 
world is that would offer a way of navigating within the turbulence of the present. I think we see 
that desire for truth in the emergence of new mechanisms of audit that, as with any mechanism of 
audit, become devices for the production of a fragile reassurance. One example is the 
proliferation of ‘fact checking’. Perhaps another symptom is that the figure of the truth teller 
multiplies and is claimed and inhabited by multiple actors. Trump presented himself as a truth 
teller. So did proponents of Brexit in the UK. One of the connections between Trump and Brexit 
is that they both promised recognition of a truth that people supposedly felt, but had been denied. 
Perhaps this intensification of a desire for ‘truth’ is symptomatic not of a ‘post-truth’ era but 
rather of the crisis of liberalism we’re living through (whilst remembering that liberalism is often 
felt to be in crisis and frequently uses the affectively imbued rhetoric of crisis).  
So, in answer to your question, for me affect is located in the continued attachment to the 
promise of truth and in the anxieties that gather around the absence of truth or, rather, an 
inchoate sense of its absence. It’s also located in the sense of confusion, or perhaps perpetual 
doubt, that follows from the increased recognition that a phenomena called ‘fake news’ exists. 
And it’s located in the desire for alternative forms of information and knowledge about the world 
and the sense of truths denied or repressed that spawns the phenomenon of fake news. It’s also 
located, in the context of new media infrastructures, in the momentary intensities of retweeting 
or sharing something that might, retrospectively, be revealed as ‘fake news’ but in the act is felt 
as a truth that matters and others should be exposed to.      
    
RM: Less than Ben, I think the contemporary is characterized by a desire for truth, but for 
authenticity. It really matters whether a political actor seems to be existentially connected with 
the politics s/he is making, with the ‘truth’ s/he is claiming, and whether s/he is putting 
him/herself at risk. This points at a dimension of political speech, embodiment, and discourse 
that is different from the question of truth. It cannot be mapped in a coordinate system from true 
to false; rather, it stands orthogonal to the truth-axis. Contemporary subjects have a sensitivity 
for someone’s attitude vis-à-vis the game of truth of politics (and others). There is an affectivity 
that concerns (or actually enacts) certain relations to the question of truth whatsoever. Whether a 
political actor comes across as attractive depends on whether s/he can authentically play with the 
game of truth, altering the rules, refusing submission to its procedures and patterns of hypocrisy, 
putting him/herself at risk for what s/he claims is the ‘truth’.  
This dimension of a relation to the game of truth is best described in terms of an attitude (or 
ethos). This ethos is perceived in terms of (embodied) authenticity. Affectivity is therefore 
located in this dimension, that is, people like how Trump acts and speaks (vis-à-vis the ‘elitist’ 
discourse of the establishment), not exactly what he says. There are many different ‘affective 
styles’ of authenticity—for the one, the dry ‘objectivity’ of a fact-checker or a newspaper dossier 
thoroughly ‘scrutinizing’ someone else’s claims is authentic; for the other, it is the macho 
demeanor that break taboos, ‘plays’ the system, and claims to tell the ‘truth’ on inconvenient 
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topics (such as migration and feminism).  
Finally, the prevalence of a strong sensitivity for (perceived) authenticity is also connected to the 
emergence of segregated discursive spheres and affect-worlds. If we were oriented around truth, 
this would be a flat structure that penetrates all milieus and subjectivities, integrating them in 
agonism. But authenticity, unlike ‘truth’, builds a spherical topology that is antagonistic. You 
would rather believe your friends than a stranger; you would rather believe someone who has 
suffered from similar things (see the media humiliations of Trump) or whom you take as an idol 
than someone who shows the insignia of scholarly competency and ‘wisdom’.  
 
VW: Ben, what do you think about the notion of ‘authenticity’ and, related, how important are 
new media infrastructures? 
BA: I really like Rainer’s attention to how authenticity is now a matter of the relation to the 
game of truth of politics. It helps us understand the rejection of ‘centrist’ politicians and political 
styles, which are felt to enact a disinterested, hypocritical, or cynical relation to the game of truth 
of politics. We need to understand more about how different styles of this embodied authenticity 
are performed and encountered in ways that cross left and right distinctions. That means paying 
more attention to the form of collective affects enabled by new media infrastructures. Every 
media infrastructures is simultaneously part of an affective infrastructure. I use ‘infrastructure’ as 
an open term for the channels and forms that mediation takes as affective life forms and 
deforms—that is, the material conditions for the circulation and distribution of intensities that 
then fold back into the infrastructure such that the material and affective become indivisible.  
Clearly, new media infrastructures such as Twitter and Facebook were central to the composition 
of the event of Trump’s emergence. For one, it is a constantly changing landscape of events and 
quasi-events; more or less intense disruptions to everyday life that provide a background sense of 
liveliness, that something is happening. They give a sense of dynamism. And I think that sense 
of something happening, of novelty, gathered around the figure of Trump and was something 
attached to by supporters and opponents.  
The global circulation of outrage in relation to Trump depends, for example, on the sense of the 
novelty and dynamism of unfolding phenomena. At the same time, new media infrastructures 
enable the composition of different but adjacent affect worlds that cluster around the same 
figure, but rarely if ever touch as separate spheres take form. One of the most important 
commonalities in the responses to the election of Trump and to the vote to leave the EU was a 
sense that people’s ‘bubbles’ had burst.  
 
RM: I agree that different adjacent affect-worlds can emerge around one and the same topic or 
figure that don’t connect. This is, in part, a consequence of media such as Facebook or Twitter, 
which are inherently segregated as they are feedback based, giving higher priority to those items 
you will probably ‘like’. In the US, also the broadcasting media is vastly split into two worlds of 
truths and affects. I also think that after Brexit and Trump, for some these bubbles had burst. 
However, I’m not so sure that many were really surprised to find out that there were other 
bubbles apart from their own. To the contrary, in order to take the problem ahead by its full 
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complexity, we should assume that most people know very well that there is another half of 
society and other bubbles of truths and affects about a certain topic. The phenomenon of affect 
and information spheres is not to be explained by plain ignorance. Rather, from an affectological 
point of view, what needs to be explained is that people want to cling to their own sphere. 
Opposing the others is more important than (and logically preceding) stating the truth. The 
bubble starts not from ignorance but from a desire for group cohesion around what is a shared 
perception of authenticity. This can be poignantly seen in the example of the dispute around 
whether the sun was shining at Trump’s inauguration, and how many people came to his 
compared to Obama’s.  
 
LK: Turning to the central question of this special issue, namely the locations of affect, in your 
respective work we have encountered two concepts which we found particularly helpful: 
Rainer’s ‘affective resonance’ (Mühlhoff 2015, 2019b) and Ben’s ‘atmospheres’ (Anderson 
2009).  
BA: This turns us to the question of form in relation to how we understand collective affects, an 
issue that I think needs much more attention and moves us away from assertions that affect is 
formless (or synonyms for the formless such as the ephemeral). Work on affect has coincided 
with a proliferation of the forms that geographers and others think and research with to make 
sense of constitution and composition; wholes, fragments, networks, structures, gases, 
circulations, and so on. But I think much more needs to be done on thinking about the 
implication of particular forms for how we understand the organization of affective lives {Au: or 
“lives”?}  
It seems to me as though two forms have implicitly dominated how atmospheres have emerged 
as a conceptual-empirical concern in the social sciences and humanities; the form of the whole 
and the form of a gas. This gives the problematic sense that an atmosphere is everywhere and 
without location. Instead, I start with the spatial form embedded in the term itself: sphere. More 
than a geometric figure, I understand atmospheres as spheres in the sense that they happen as 
some kind of temporary organization of a series of formless, even chaotic, (in/non)human forces. 
So atmospheres are the temporary creation of an interior and an outside. The consequence is that 
we must always think about atmospheres in the plural and assume, before analysis, a fractured, 
uneven, geography of atmospheres that don’t align or add up. This is what I was getting at in 
relation to the discussion of the affective worlds that form in relation to new media 
infrastructures in your previous question.  
 
RM: What I am calling ‘affective resonance’ is a mutually coconstituted dynamic of affecting 
and being affected between a (small) number of individuals (typically in a dyad or small group). 
The crucial point about resonance is that although the dynamic is reciprocally constituted (that is, 
equally deriving from the affective dispositions of each of the individuals in a nonadditive but 
entangled fashion), it is not necessarily symmetric in form. There is a myriad of mutually 
stabilizing but asymmetric, complementary, or antagonistic affective roles. Me being grumpy 
and passive aggressive may be the result of my partner playing extra cool and extra happy in a 
certain situation—and half a day later, roles may switch. Me doing a certain gendered 
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performance of interaffectivity in a certain hookup may be induced by the other person playing a 
complementary but not symmetric role to mine—and in another hookup I find myself in a 
different role.  
The key about resonance is that the dynamics of affecting and being affected one engages in are 
always both deriving from your own affective disposition and irreducibly coshaped by the 
other’s affective disposition (Mühlhoff 2018, 2019a,b). Affective resonance is a process where 
patterns of affecting and being affected dynamically stabilize in a concrete relation of 
individuals; resonance is causally symmetric (that is, reciprocal) but not synchronizing in form. 
To me, affective resonance is therefore a concept designed for analyses of micropower bringing 
about a subject’s embodiment in the affective niches of microsocial formations. It can be used to 
discuss how social structures and microsocial power differences may dynamically stabilize in 
interaffectivity.  
I think that the concept of an atmosphere, as Ben understands it, captures a potentially similar 
phenomenon, but from a different perspective. Through the lens of atmospheres, affective 
relations between individuals are seen in terms of a geography of spheres; if individuals are 
involved in an atmosphere, this results in a certain kind of (momentary) inside/outside 
delineation towards other parts of the world. For the concept of resonance, inside vs. outside, or 
the topology of spheres of affect, is not the starting point, rather, resonance names an inherent 
quality of intensity that is located on the level of causal relations (and remains open on the 
question of which concrete forms emerge). Therefore I think that the concept of resonance could 
go together with Ben’s atmospheres very well and shed some light on what is going on within an 
(atmo)sphere. It can explain how asymmetric ways of affecting and being affected might emerge 
as a reciprocal process between different individuals within the same atmosphere. 
 
BA: I’m intrigued by Rainer’s distinction between the symmetric and the asymmetric, as it stays 
with the problem of form, as well as the question of how specific concepts help us attune to the 
organization of affect. It raises the question of whether atmosphere as a concept can be thought 
of outside the form of a whole, and of the relation between atmosphere and that which is 
conditioned by and in turn enacts and carries atmosphere. My starting point is not to presume 
that the relation is necessarily between an atmosphere and an individual, as two already-existing 
things. As atmospheres form and deform, they condition and fold into the formation of any 
number of collectives—whether between two, or in relation to the groups we give the names 
crowds or publics too, or even the weak forms of collective sociality as we inhabit a shared space 
with others.  
In other words, for me, atmosphere allows us to ask what is and isn’t shared and allows us to 
wonder away at the strange types of affective mediation that condition without determining 
affective life. What I like about Rainer’s concept of affective resonance is that it is addresses the 
question of causality, an issue too often forgotten about in the wake of critiques of forms of 
linear causation. I like how it opens up space to begin from the relation between two and allows 
attunement to the multiplicity of forces that make up what is an irreducibly complicated relation 
composed of a range of trajectories, tendencies, and latencies.      
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RM: Yes, I agree, and I see a lot of fruitful exchange between the two concepts. Affective 
resonance, as it is a causal concept, enables a strong microsocial perspective, asking what are 
peoples’ affective dispositions (or capacities to resonate), how do they result from their 
biographic past, and how do they enter into affective dynamics in the presence based on a 
nonlinear interplay of affecting and being affected. Ben’s concept of atmosphere enables to point 
out how, perhaps based on resonance/dissonance dynamics and enabled by media spaces, 
(temporary) segregation into spheres of discourses and affect worlds takes place. An atmosphere 
is then a kind of (temporary) structure that is to a certain degree independent of the concrete 
individuals within, in the sense that some might go, others might come, and the atmosphere still 
persists. An atmosphere thus seems to come with some kind of spatiotemporal cohesion, maybe 
it is stabilized as affects circulate around discursive entities and objectives that are crystallizing 
points in the organization of affectivity within such a sphere, maybe they are stabilized by forces 
of repulsion or segregation between the spheres.  
 
LK: Ben, earlier you have located affect in pervasive attachments to (truth-)promises. We 
wonder, what are the promised ‘objects’ (Ahmed 2003) of the political right, and what can we 
learn from these promised objects about the spatiotemporal dimension of affect worlds?   
BA: Let’s take the example of Trump’s promise to build a wall. The promised object is not yet 
there, or at least is only just becoming materially there in the form of prototypes, but the promise 
is present, and the promise has an affective charge and force. I’m interested in the charge and 
force of promises as they are encountered and related to. In the case of the wall promised by the 
Trump administration, it was entangled with racialized and xenophobic bellicosity, carnivalesque 
boasting, and a critique of contemporary America amid a felt story of decline. And it’s through 
the hopes invested in its construction that the promise comes to act on and through the feel of the 
here and now. We might also think of how failed promises, and associated lost or disappointed 
hopes, linger and live on. Your question is, then, an important one because it reminds us that 
affect is a matter of the (re/de)composition of the present—but a present stretched into strange 
types of time; past presents, present pasts, future presents, past futures, and so on.   
 
RM: There is a parallel to Trump’s ‘wall’ project in German politics that always struck me: 
Horst Seehofer, a conservative German politician (CSU) of the same generation as Trump, 
former minister-president of Bavaria, now the new Minister of Interior of Germany, has for years 
been catching a lot of media attention around his populist idea of an ‘Obergrenze’ (upper limit) 
to the number of refugees admitted per year to Germany. It is interesting how the spatial term of 
a ‘Grenze’ (border) is barely concealed in the term ‘Obergrenze’, which is formally (but not 
psychologically) only about a ‘number’. In analysis of the circulation of affects around this topic, 
one has to ask, why are people so easily affected by what seems to come across as a penetration 
of their (nation-state’s) borders? Here my choice of research perspective would be a kind of 
social psychology based on affect theory, investigating into peoples’ affective dispositions. 
There is a thought by Klaus Theweleit (1980) that speaks a lot to me although it needs rephrasing 
in less psychoanalytic but more affect-theoretical terms: He observes, in his writings on World 
War II, that followers of fascism seem to conflate, psychologically, the border of the nation-state 
with the surface (or border) of their own bodies, and this again is connected to certain 
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psychological limits. There seems to be widely proliferated psychological disposition where 
violation to nation-state borders are felt as violations to one’s own physical integrity.  
 
CHP: Let us turn now to the question of what an ‘affective counterpolitics’ (Massumi 2015) 
might entail. We would like to first ask Rainer, who has problematized elsewhere a language of 
‘political correctness’ as exclusive (Mühlhoff 2017b). Do you think reflecting on affective 
politics is more important than a critique of language in antiracist and antisexist struggles? 
 
RM: I do not think it makes sense to weigh between these alternatives, since affective politics 
and antiracism/antisexism are not opposites, but very important for each other. Answering this is 
of course a controversial thing to do for me as a white man. All I say may be quite rightly 
dismissed by those who know better. What I was suggesting in the text you mention is that from 
an affect perspective, antiracist and antisexist work cannot be reduced to language politics (such 
as gender-neutral language) and codes of conduct one has to submit to when entering a certain 
political group/space. I see the political genesis and adequacy of such instruments in some 
contexts. But first, the problem is that adhering to linguistic and behavioral forms does not 
address or change the sexism and racism in people’s affective dispositions, based on which they 
are able to commit violent speech or behavior in the first place. And second, the implementation 
of rule books and language policies runs the risk of turning into an authoritarian policing that 
creates inclusions and exclusions to a political space based on a moral codex. Sometimes the 
persons who commit such policing seem to be doing this over the heads of potential victims and 
with a ‘lust’ of self-righteousness that seems not fully reflected. Importantly, this is not a general 
feature of leftist, antiracist, or feminist spaces, but individuals with a ‘watchdog mentality’ can 
go unnoticed in these environments as they share the consensus to combat discrimination. 
I think this behavior is counterproductive because antidiscrimination politics should aim at 
mutual awareness-raising that also addresses the underlying affective and psychological 
structures of discriminatory behavior in each of us. The implementation of language policies, on 
the other hand, sometimes tends to create a code of belonging vs. not-belonging that operates by 
making people feel ashamed instead of trying to convince them. At least if integrating people 
from other ‘bubbles’ (such as the so-called ‘popular class’) into a broader political movement is 
the goal, one should notice that language codes can silence people or give them the feeling that 
everything they say is already clumsy and inappropriate. That’s why I think in a political space, 
sexist or racist statements should be countered on a political and not a moral register. Otherwise, 
political spaces become ethically charged, displacing agonistic dispute to personal antagonisms. 
Of course this is often hard, affectively, as it may entail standing a conversation where other(s) 
use violent vocabulary or invectives, and it requires tough skills to oppose such utterances and 
performances (which are often loud and space-consuming) quickly and firmly on a level of 
political argument. And, after all, it is not the job of victims and traumatized people to explain 
again and again why certain behavior is violent. Yet, in the moment when we seek to establish a 
broad societal left movement, we need left political spaces that are not ‘safe spaces’ but where a 
clash of habitus and affective personality traits can happen on agonistic grounds. (And still, we 
also need safe spaces; I’m not denying this.) I agree that the private is political, but that doesn’t 
conversely imply that all the political should also be private: Not all political spaces should 
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collapse into social and intimate spaces, or ‘ethical bubbles’, in short.  
 
LK: Ben, would you agree that the ‘micropolitical’ dimension is crucial for an affective 
counterpolitics? 
BA: The micropolitical is not synonymous with the small scale or the private. A micropolitical 
dimension is a constitutive dimension of all political activity and any political movement, and 
allows us to attune to and notice the tones that animate political action and how that action bears 
an affective quality, or qualities. That’s partly a theoretical lesson from Deleuze and Guattari’s 
analysis of fascism, which I always discuss when I teach Deleuze and Guattari given how 
important the reaction to fascism is in their thought, but it’s also something that is learned from 
long traditions of reflection by activists on the material and affective infrastructures that political 
movements attempt to build to sustain action. As for the answers today, I’d begin with trying to 
understand the dynamics of what’s happening in response to Trump’s racism and xenophobia 
and attempt to relate to them through the practice of something like a hopeful criticism that 
discloses potentialities as immanent to the unfolding dynamics of a conjuncture. I think my hope 
in relation to Trump as he emerged as a candidate was that a bored counterpublic would take 
form and, in doing so, drain the eventfulness from his emergence. This would be a counterpublic 
that responded with indifference, with a shrug, rather than in a manner that amplified attention 
and fascination. It would be a counterpublic that didn’t laugh at jokes about Trump on late-night 
comedy shows, who didn’t retweet amusing Trump-related memes or GIFs.  
This clearly didn’t happen; too many people were enthralled, entertained, as well as outraged. In 
a world where events come and go, and where attention is scarce, we need to think again about 
apathy, indifference, boredom, and other forms of nonaction as doing political work. As for what 
else is happening, this feels to me like a very hopeful moment if we stay with the counterpublics 
who counterpoise other forms of belonging and ways of practicing collective life in common to 
those associated with right-wing populisms and associated forms of racism or sexism. Critique is 
necessary but not sufficient for these counterpublics; what is also present are hopeful stories that 
people can attach to and prefigurative actions that make traces of futures present. It comes back 
to the discussion earlier about the stories we tell about the present—what we choose to attend to 
and amplify. I’d like to do some work on the formations of hope and hopefulness that emerge 
and endure in so-called crisis times, in which the present is too often reduced to a simple story 
about the emergence of a populism. Staying with hope, with the unequal distribution of the sense 
of possibility, strikes me as a good way of refusing to perform totalizing stories of what the 
present is.   
 
VW: To conclude, could you expand on the challenges of translating academic 
conceptualizations of affect to the realm of realpolitik, and how to ‘relocate’ them to conference 
panels, public discussions, or other spaces that we enter as academics? 
BA: I don’t think this is a different kind of challenge to the generic challenge of translating any 
academic conceptualization to the realm of realpolitik, although even posing the question in 
these terms assumes a lot about the location of realpolitik and the practice and location of 
(academic) conceptualizations. I would say, to begin, that conceptualization as practice and 
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concepts as devices for attuning and noticing have many divergent functions, in addition to doing 
work in relation to the realm of realpolitik. That said, what modes of academic practice are 
necessary in order to aid the project of interrupting and perhaps reconfiguring—if only in the 
most minor of ways—the (de)formation of those collective affects that are entwined with, or lead 
to the perpetuation, of forms of damage and harm? The question is how to translate conceptual 
work into a disposition—or set of dispositions—that may move people, recognizing that work on 
affect is a way of understanding people’s attachment and investment in the worlds they are 
continually making and remaking. Typically, the role has been one of the critic who in a tone 
often of anger and outrage interrupts and disrupts with the hope of ending or at least pausing 
something already ongoing. Critique is necessary, but on its own I think it can fail to move 
people, to offer a world for people to attach to and invest in. We are in an interesting moment 
when practices of criticism are expanding and what critique is changing as part of a questioning 
of what’s lost when we relate to the world and others through criticism and as critics. It’s a 
mistake to equate being critical in this specific sense with being political. New figures and 
practices are emerging, though, associated in part but not exclusively with work on affective life; 
the storyteller who tells affect imbued stories about a situation in a way that resonates and 
moves, for example, or the killjoy—after the work of Sara Ahmed (2017)—who interrupts 
consensus, or the utopian who diagnoses the tendencies and latencies, futures already on the 
way, that constitute the present. The first question of translation, then, is thinking through the 
practice of engagement with others, in the wake of a growing movement away from a practice of 
criticism based on a hermeneutics of suspicion that relates to the world through what Eve 
Sedgwick described as a ‘paranoid style of knowing’ (cf. Sedgwick 2003, 123 ff.)  
However, I’m not sure it’s possible or desirable, then, to establish any kind of a priori ethos or 
practice through which to inhabit the spaces of realpolitik. It’s not for me to issue guidelines. 
Partly, because we need to start from the diversity of approaches that are gathered under the 
name ‘affect theory’. More than that, though, in my own work I’m interested in how the concepts 
that surround affect enable us to attend to and notice the dynamics of the present in relation to 
singular circumstances and worlds. It’s obviously a Foucauldian disposition towards what 
conceptual work can do, and one I’ve tried to perform in relation to my past work on the ‘war on 
terror’ and current work on the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. This means the question of 
translation is always specific. Finally, it is really important that translation not be reduced to a 
unidirectional process between two separate spheres—from conceptualization to realpolitik. My 
worry is that work on affect risks becoming ossified, reduced to a series of unsurprising case 
studies applying affect (or linked concepts such as atmosphere) to this or that substantive topic. 
What I’m intrigued about at the moment is whether we can ensure the concepts we work with 
around affect are at risk as they are exposed to different worlds or contexts.  
I’ll finish by giving just two examples that have inspired me to try and better inhabit this 
necessary space of risky conceptual work, both of which center the new problems that thinking 
and researching and acting with affect can surface, as well as unsettle existing conceptual claims 
and understandings. Joseph R. Winters’s (2016) Hope Draped in Black is a fascinating account 
of the presence of a specific form of hope and hopefulness—‘melancholic hope’—in a black 
literary and aesthetic tradition associated with W. E. B. Du Bois, Ralph Ellison, Toni Morrison, 
and Charles Burnett. For Winter, what is unique about this tradition is that, in the context of the 
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enduring belief that America follows a trajectory of racial progress, hope becomes productive as 
it is connected to loss and as the uncomfortable is inhabited and stayed with. I’m reading it 
alongside and returning to Lauren Berlant’s (2011) Cruel Optimism—which is present in all my 
work over the last five years—to try and think through different ways in which dreams and 
fantasies (in Berlant’s case the American Dream, in Winter’s the dream of a trajectory of racial 
progress) are entwined with forms of damage in ways that make the lines between that which 
sustains and that which harms blurred. What I love about the two books, and I should stress that 
Winters is not explicitly intervening in debates around affect in the way that Berlant does, is how 
named affects (‘melancholic hope’ and ‘cruel optimism’) become occasions for thinking and 
feeling questions of the (de)composition of the social. And that as new problems and questions 
are approached, the archive of what counts as work with an interest in affect changes in 
productive and disruptive ways—stretching, for example, into the traditions of queer theory and 
ideology critique Berlant is in dialogue with, or expanding into the black political-aesthetic 
tradition Winter writes about in conjunction with the Frankfurt school. Both books are full of 
translations between work on affect and other partially connected fields and scenes. What I learn 
from this work is to try and remain unsettled in our conceptualizations of affect, to practice 
translation as an ongoing process.    
 
RM: To me an important point in any attempt of translating affect theory to realpolitik is that 
affect theory should not be understood and not be conducted as an objectivating science, where a 
putatively disinterested researcher-subject with a putatively waterproof methodology looks from 
a detached position onto reality out there. Affect theory is to me always a form of involved and 
situated theorizing in a rather humble sense.  
This has a variety of implications. To start with, it means that researchers are involved with their 
own affectivity in their theorizing. While traditional science which is following the idea of an 
epistemological ‘subject-object split’ sees this as a problem and tries to eradicate any subjective 
components from scholarly insight, in affect theory this is not a deficiency but a gain and a 
method. Being affectively involved provides a new sensorium for scientific insight; if affect-
theoretical concepts correlate to affective experience, this is a way of equipping concepts with a 
deep layer of intuition that prevents them from being ‘blind concepts’. Of course, this becomes 
scholarly work only in the moment when it doesn’t boil down to mere subjectivism or relativism. 
Preventing this is the tough job of affect-theoretical methodology—which in my view often fails. 
Methodologically, the challenge is to establish shared intuitions and articulations not by means 
of abstraction but neither by means of merely attitudinal attunement, but by deep 
communication, sharing, and discussion of research results.  
In my view, the community of affect scholars (to which I have an ambivalent relationship) 
sometimes falls in the trap of indulging in a certain esotericism and creating a specific ‘reality 
bubble’ ourselves. This is one of the reasons for my plea to go on the streets and seek 
confrontation, especially if one is researching a subject that concerns others (such as in the case 
of right-wing populist affects, which I really just do not feel myself so that it is hard to actually 
have a nonspeculative and nonprojecting intuition of what’s really going on in those people). As 
problematic as it may sound, I think that researching these subjectivities and their affects means 
exposing oneself to their bodily presence, because only then can I use my own body with its 
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affective sensitivities as a seismographic instrument to see what these other bodies can do (to 
me) affectively and how their violence, hatred, ressentiments, etc., work. For me this strategy of 
self-exposure is a core methodology. Its prerequisite is to always try to know yourself, know 
your sensitivities, resonance points, dissonance tendencies, traumas, and trigger points, so that 
based on this knowledge you can use your body as a sensor or a measuring device for affective 
dynamics around you—but of which you are a constitutive part in the moment you enter the 
field.  
Another implication is that in my opinion, affect-theoretical descriptions cannot be evaluated by 
a universal truth-value but they find their reality by the criterion of their (political) efficacy. 
Whether an affect-theoretical description is adequate or not is a matter of what it enables the 
subject to do, or to see, differently. How much does a certain concept, a certain description help 
someone to an emancipating insight or to an empowering articulation of what’s going on with 
me and with others? It is problematic if one tries to talk about others’ affects from an external 
perspective in a judging fashion—that is, in a discourse to which the affected persons are only an 
object. Here I agree with Ben’s point on the (limited) role of criticism. Of course, you can talk 
about others’ affects, but had better do it in a way that is addressing them, that is interested in 
their emancipation or transformation, or in getting to know them better by making them speak. 
Following this approach, it is not on us as scholars to tell people the ‘truth’ about their affects, 
their subjectivities, their politics. Our game is to provide concepts and descriptions that resonate 
with others’ experience and might prove helpful in someone’s own process of emancipation.  
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